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SHEDDING THEIR RIGHTS: THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT AND SUSPICIONLESS DRUG




Although public school students do not "shed their constitutional
rights ... at the schoolhouse gate,"' it is well established that students
have a decreased expectation of privacy while under the protection,
guidance, and supervision of the public school system.2 The question is,
where do we draw the line? At what point does a search become so
intrusive as to infringe upon the Fourth Amendment rights of American
public school children?
The Fourth Amendment provides: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause .... ."3 Over time, the Supreme Court developed a "special needs"
exception to the Fourth Amendment.4  This exception permits
warrantless searches "when 'special needs exist beyond the normal need
for law enforcement, mak[ing] the warrant and probable cause
requirement impracticable."' 5 The Supreme Court applied this exception
J.D. Candidate, May 2003, The Catholic University of American, Columbus School of
Law.
1. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (holding
that preventing students from wearing black armbands in protest of the Vietnam war
violated their First Amendment rights to free speech and expression). The Supreme
Court stated, "[i]n our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of
totalitarianism. School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students.
Students in school ...are 'persons' under our Constitution. They are possessed of
fundamental rights which the State must respect." Id. at 511.
2. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656-57 (1995).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989)
(recognizes the "special needs" exception to the Fourth Amendment).
5. Id. at 619 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1998)). The Supreme
Court began to develop the special needs exception in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387
U.S. 523 (1967), by condoning a warrantless search pursuant to a municipal health code
despite a traditional showing of probable cause. Id. at 537-39. The Court reasoned the
state's health and safety interest in conducting the search outweighed the homeowner's
privacy interests. Id. at 539. By relaxing the probable cause standard and replacing it with
a reasonableness test, the Court established the framework for special needs analysis. Id.;
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to public schools, noting the need to strike a balance between students'
legitimate expectations of privacy and the need of school officials to
maintain discipline and order.6
In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,7 the Supreme Court upheld
the school district's drug testing program, which authorized random,
suspicionless testing of all students participating in interscholastic
athletics.8 The Supreme Court validated the drug testing scheme after
the school district revealed widespread drug use among student athletes.9
Since Vernonia, both the Seventh and Eighth Circuits have extended this
holding, permitting random, suspicionless drug testing of all students who
participate in extracurricular activities."'
see also Griffin, 483 U.S. at 872-73 (upholding the search of a probationer's home using a
special needs analysis which replaces probable cause with reasonableness as grounds for a
search).
6. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (discussing the application of the
special needs exception to public schools); see also Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661-62
(discussing the special need of school officials to drug test their athletes).
7. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
8. Id. at 664-65.
9. Id. at 662-63; see also Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1356-57
(D.Or. 1992) (indicating the levels of drug use among athletes observed by teachers). The
district court made the following findings:
[G]lamorization and use of drugs and alcohol became more blatant. All of the
teachers who testified at trial expressed how appalled and helpless they felt as
students increasingly expressed their attraction to, and vocal defense of, the use
of drugs. Students boasted about drug use and regaled one another with stories
of the latest "high" or "party". Class decorum suffered .... Outbursts of
profane language during class, rude and obscene statements directed at other
students, and a general flagrant attitude that there was nothing the school could
do about their conduct or their use of drugs or alcohol typified a usual day.
Organizations formed within the student drug culture taking such names as the
"Big Elks" or the "Drug Cartel." ... Drug paraphernalia was confiscated on
schools grounds, and open use of drugs was observed at a local cafe across the
street from the high school.
Drug and alcohol use also invaded the sports program. Students consumed
alcohol on a bus after a game. Others stole alcohol from a store after a track
meet .... [S]uspected drug use contributed to the injury of a wrestler who failed
to execute a basic maneuver. When visiting the hotel room of the student the
next day the smell of marijuana permeated the area .... [D]rug use affected
certain footballs players in that they ignored or forgot well-drilled safety routines
The evidence amply demonstrated that the administration was at its wits
end and that a large segment of the student body, particularly those involved in
interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion.
Id. at 1356-57.
10. Miller v. Wilkes, 172 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1999), vacated as moot, No. 98-3227, 1999
U.S. App. LEXIS 13289, at *1 (8th Cir. June 15, 1999). The appellant was no longer a
student in the school district and could not be subjected to the policy. Id. at 582. Since
Drug Testing of Public School Students
In March 2001, the Tenth Circuit rejected a similar policy, holding that
simply choosing to participate in an activity does not eliminate a
student's expectation of privacy." Although drug testing may be an
effective deterrent in preventing teen drug use, the constitutionality of
extending these drug testing programs to a wider body of students is
unclear.12 Such policies invade students' privacy rights without showing
any reason to believe that they or their peers are using drugs. 3
Miller was the only plaintiff in this case, it became moot during the course of the appeal.
Id.; see also Todd v. Rush County Schs., 133 F.3d 985 (7th Cir. 1998).
11. Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1276 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct.
509 (2001); see also Lois Romano, High Court to Consider Case on Drug Testing: Degree
of Student Screening Is at Issue, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2001, at A3. While the school
district argues that drug testing will deter drug use and addresses the need to maintain safe
schools, opponents argue that random drug testing violates the students' right to privacy.
Id.
12. See Drug Testing in Schools: An Effective Deterrent?, Hearing Before the
Subcomrr on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources of the House Comm.
on Gov't Reform, 106th Cong. 9 (2000) (statement of Harry Connick, District Attorney,
Orleans Parish, New Orleans, La., discussing the effectiveness of a mandatory drug testing
program employed by parochial schools in Louisiana). But see William J. Bailey,
Suspicionless Drug Testing in Schools, Indiana Prevention Resource Center (July 19,
1997), available at http://www.drugs.indiana.edu/issues/suspicionless.html (arguing that
there is no evidence that these programs are successful, that the inexpensive form of drug
testing that most schools rely on often produces false positives, and that suspicionless drug
testing creates "an implicit statement of mistrust"). The current circuit split reflects the
controversy surrounding this issue. Compare Earls, 242 F.3d at 1276 (holding that
suspicionless drug testing of all students who participate in extracurricular activities is
unconstitutional and that merely volunteering to join an activity does not automatically
decrease privacy expectations) with Miller, 172 F.3d at 581 (upholding suspicionless drug
testing as reasonable under Vernonia) and Todd, 133 F.3d at 986 (upholding suspicionless
drug testing of all students who participate in extracurricular activities as reasonable under
Vernonia). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Earls on November 9, 2001. Bd. of
Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92. v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 509 (2001); see also Anne Gearan,
Wider School Drug Test Considered, NEWSDAY, November 9, 2001, at A35. Proponents
of random drug testing argue that it will deter drug testing and that a student who wants to
participate in an activity can say, "'I want to participate in this band competition, so I'm
not going to do that."' Id. Opponents claim it is intrusive and violates the Fourth
Amendment right to privacy. See id. Lindsey Earls, the student initiated the lawsuit
stated, "'I felt they were accusing us and convicting us before they had given us a chance."'
Id. Earls tested negative for drugs in 1999, but said, "[the drug test] was horrible.
Someone would stand outside the bathroom stall and listen." Id. The school district
tested 484 students; four tested positive. Anne Gearan, Wider School Drug Test
Considered, NEWSDAY, Nov. 9, 2001, at A35, available at http://www.s-t.com/daily/11-
01/11-09-01/al6wn081.htm. As the students' representative, the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU), fears a slippery slope--if schools can drug test students merely because
they join extracurricular activities, "anybody with a voluntary interaction with any level of
government" could be drug tested without suspicion. Id.
13. See, e.g., Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 1064-65 (7th Cir.
2000) (upholding a suspicionless drug testing policy for students participating in
extracurricular activities while noting that the school district made no showing that these
2002]
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This Comment examines the "special needs" exception to the Fourth
Amendment and its application to the public school system. This
Comment first discusses the Supreme Court's application of the Fourth
Amendment to public schools and the expansion of suspicionless drug
testing to include interscholastic athletes. Then, it examines suspicionless
drug testing in other contexts. Next, this Comment reviews the Seventh
and Eighth Circuit interpretations of Vernonia to allow suspicionless
drug testing of all students participating in extracurricular activities. This
Comment then examines the split between the Circuits by discussing the
Tenth Circuit's holding that subjecting all students who participate in
extracurricular activities to random, suspicionless drug testing is
unconstitutional. This Comment next analyzes various circuit court
decisions and argues that the Tenth Circuit properly determined that
random, suspicionless drug testing of all students who participate in
extracurricular activities, without some initial showing of drug use among
these students, violates students' rights under the Fourth Amendment.
Finally, this Comment explores the public policy considerations raised by
this issue and determines that other means exist to address drug use by
school aged children.
I. APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS -
DETERMINING WHAT LEVEL OF PRIVACY IS REASONABLE FOR
CHILDREN ATTENDING SCHOOL
When a school district establishes a random drug testing policy, there
is an inherent risk that students will be tested without any particularized
suspicion of drug use. 4 Although many courts do not find the drug test
students were shown to be using drugs); Miller, 172 F.3d at 580 (upholding policy
permitting drug testing of all students participating in extracurricular activities while
indicating that the school district did not show an immediate crisis of drug use among
these students); Todd, 133 F.3d at 985-86 (upholding drug testing program requiring
consent to drug testing as a prerequisite to participate in any extracurricular activity
without showing a particularized drug problem among students who participate in these
activities). Cf Earls, 242 F.3d at 1277-78 (striking down the school district's drug testing
as unconstitutional because it did not reveal any evidence that students participating in
extracurricular activities were using drugs, negating a showing of special need).
14. See Earls, 242 F.3d at 1273-1275 (noting that only four of the students tested
under this policy tested positive for drug use, indicating that there was little, if any reason
to believe that there was a drug use problem among students participating in
extracurricular activities); Todd, 133 F.3d at 985 (allowing drug testing despite the school
district's lack of showing drug use among the students to be tested); see also Vernonia, 515
U.S. at 667 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that the authorization of random drug
testing of student athletes will subject students "whom have given school officials no
reason whatsoever to suspect they use drugs at school.., to an intrusive bodily search.).
[Vol. 51:951
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itself to be intrusive, the privacy issues at stake remain high. 5 Merely
being between the ages of thirteen and eighteen can subject an otherwise
innocent student to unnecessary drug testing, sending the message that
school children should not and cannot be trusted. 16 In Vernonia, The
Supreme Court expanded the "special needs" exception to allow
suspicionless drug testing of interscholastic athletes after the school
district displayed a compelling need to drug test its athletes. 7 In so
holding, the Supreme Court decreased the constitutional standard for
searches conducted by school officials to include suspicionless drug
testing of a portion of the student body.'8
A. The Constitutionality of Searches in Public Schools
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 9 the Supreme Court, while holding that
school personnel are bound by the Fourth Amendment, noted that the
"special needs of the school environment require assessment of the
legality of such searches against a standard less exacting than that of
probable cause."' In this case, a teacher found two students smoking in
a restroom and took the students to the principal's office.2 ' While there,
the assistant vice principal searched T.L.O.'s purse and found a pack of
cigarettes and evidence of marijuana use." T.L.O. confessed to sellingmarijuana at school and the State brought charges against her in the
15. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658 (stating that the "degree of intrusion depends upon the
manner in which production of the urine sample is monitored" and concluding that the
school district's testing procedures were not intrusive because they were "nearly identical
to [conditions] typically encountered in public restrooms"); Earls, 242 F.3d 1276 (stating
that, in accordance with Vernonia, the manner of obtaining the urine sample was not
significantly intrusive). But see Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095, 1100
(Colo. 1998) (stating that although students did not complain about the drug testing
procedure, which was virtually identical to the procedure approved of in Vernonia, one
student was unable to produce a urine sample because 'he was too embarrassed to do
so"'). Even though courts have found that the procedure used is not overly intrusive, it is
embarrassing to some students. Id.
16. Bailey, supra note 12; see also Katherine Long, Many Oppose Drug Testing for
Students - It's Sending the Wrong Message to Kids, Parents Say of Northshore Suggestion,
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 30, 1997, at B1.
17. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65.
1& Id.
19. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,333, 334 (1985).
20. Id. at 332 n.2.
21. Id. at 328.
22- Id. The contents of T.L.O's purse included, "a small amount of mari[j]uana, a
pipe, a number of empty plastic bags, a substantial quantity of money in one-dollar bills,
an index card that appeared to be a list of students who owed T.L.O. money, and two
letters that implicated T.L.O. in mari[j]uana dealing." Id.
2002]
Catholic University Law Review
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Middlesex County. 3 T.L.O.
moved to suppress the evidence found in her purse and claimed that the
unlawful search tainted her confession.24 The Juvenile Court denied
T.L.O's motion to suppress and the Supreme Court affirmed 5
In upholding this search, the Supreme Court used a balancing test,
seeking to strike a balance between the government's need to maintain
control and safety in schools and the privacy rights of the students
involved.26 The Court concluded that the standard of reasonableness for
school children is one that "stops short of probable cause." 27 The Court
stated that school officials "need not obtain a warrant before searching a
student who is under their authority."' The Court further held that
searches by school officials will be permissible when "the measures
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and [are]
not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the
nature of the infraction., 29  The Court gave deference to school
personnel, stating that, ordinarily, searches will be valid as long as there
is a reasonable belief that the search will reveal evidence of criminal
activity or a violation of school rules.3°
The reasonableness of a search by school personnel depends on the
context in which it occurs.1  To determine the standard of
reasonableness, the necessity of the search is balanced against the
invasion of privacy that the search creates.32 In so holding, the Supreme
Court left school personnel with the discretion to determine when it was
reasonably necessary to search a student under its control.33
23. Id. at 329.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 329, 333 (citing State ex rel. T.L.O., 178 N.J. Super. 329 (1980)). The
Juvenile Court stated that a school official can validly search a student based on "a
reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is in the process of being committed, or
reasonable cause to believe that the search is necessary to maintain school discipline or
enforce school policies." Id. at 329. The Supreme Court determined that the search did
not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 333.
26. Id. at 341.
27. See id.
2& Id. at 340.
29. Id. at 342.
30. Id. at 341-42.
31. Id. at 337.
32. Id. (quoting Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)).
33. Id. at 340-41.
[Vol. 51:951
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B. Suspicionless Drug Testing of Interscholastic Athletes is Valid Under a
Special Needs Analysis
After school personnel observed a rapid escalation of drug use and
reasoned that "athletes were the leaders of the drug culture," the
Vernonia School District adopted The Student Athlete Drug Policy,
authorizing random urinalysis of interscholastic athletes. 34 The school
district initiated its drug testing program after less intrusive means failed
to decrease the drug abuse problems evident among athletes.35 Under
this policy, students wishing to participate in interscholastic athletics
were required to sign a consent form agreeing to drug testing and to
obtain written consent for the testing from their parents.
36
The Supreme Court upheld this policy, noting the significant concerns
that the school district sought to address. 37 The Court pointed out the
exceptional public health need to deter drug use by adolescents,
specifically because their minds and bodies are still developing.38 The
Court further noted the particular concerns regarding drug use among
athletes, specifically the risk of physical harm facing athletes and their
34. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648-50 (1995). The school district
revealed that students were speaking out about the drug culture and that "there was
nothing the school could do about it." Id. at 648. Furthermore, the number of disciplinary
referrals more than doubled, students were increasingly disruptive in class, and more
students were suspended. Id. at 649. The district court found that student athletes were
the "leaders of the drug culture." Id. (citing Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F.
Supp. 1354, 1357 (D.Or.1992)). The district court made specific findings that student
athletes were using drugs and alcohol. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1357. School personnel
testimony revealed drug and alcohol use by athletes, including: students drinking alcohol
on a bus following a game, students stealing alcohol after a track meet, an injury to a
wrestler caused by suspected drug use, the smell of marijuana coming from a student's
hotel room, and a failure to execute "well-drilled" safety routines. Id. The Supreme
Court relied heavily on these facts in upholding Vernonia's drug testing program.
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662-63.
35. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 649. The school district first responded to the increased
drug use by offering "special classes, speakers, and presentations designed to deter drug
use," and did not turn to drug testing until these efforts failed. Id.; see also Acton, 796 F.
Supp. at 1357 (stating that the school first attempted to address the drug use problem with
educational programs and did not institute drug testing until it became apparent that
"unless [they] took immediate action, the problem was going to get far worse...").
36. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 650. The school tested its athletes at the beginning of each
season for their sport and, once the season began, placed the names of the athletes in a
pool where they blindly drew names of athletes for random testing. Id.
37. Id. at 661 (noting the significant concerns raised by adolescent drug use); see also
Acton, 796 F.Supp at 1356-1357 (describing testimony from Dr. DuPont regarding the
harmful consequence of drug use on one's "motivation, memory, judgment, reaction,
coordination and performance").
3& Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661-662.
2002]
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competitors in contact sports.39 The Court examined the specific privacy
concerns facing athletes and stated that by "choosing to 'go out for the
team' [the students] voluntarily subjected themselves to a degree of
regulation even higher than that imposed on students generally." 4 When
comparing the significant concerns facing the school district and the
decreased privacy expectations already encountered by athletes, the
Court concluded that this policy was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.
41
The Supreme Court established a three-part balancing test to
determine when suspicionless searches are reasonable in public schools.42
The Court first considered "the nature of the privacy interest upon which
the search ...at issue intrudes."43  Second, the Court examined the
"character of the intrusion that is complained of."'' Finally, the Court
took into account the "nature and immediacy of the governmental
concern at issue ... and the efficacy of this means for meeting it.''45
In examining the nature of the privacy interest, the Court
described the traditional role of the school system as "custodial and
tutelary."' 6 In upholding the drug testing policy, the Court acknowledged
that schools must exercise a great deal of supervisory responsibility over
the students under its control. The Court then found that the character
of the intrusion that the students complained of was negligible.4 Finally,
39. Id. at 662.
40. Id. at 657. The Supreme Court analogized student athletes to adults working in a
"closely regulated industry," stating that athletes have "reason to expect intrusions upon
[their] normal rights and privileges, including privacy." Id.
41. Id. at 664-65.
42. Id. at 652-60.
43. Id. at 654.
44. Id. at 658.
45. Id. at 660.
46. Id. at 655. The Supreme Court stated that this custodial authority permits a
"degree of supervision and control that could not be exercised over free adults," and that
"'a proper educational environment requires close supervision of schoolchildren, as well as
the enforcement of rules against conduct that would be perfectly permissible if undertaken
by an adult."' Id. (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985)).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 658. Examining the character of the intrusion, the Supreme Court
considered the high level of privacy ordinarily given to excretory functions, along with
how the student produced the urine sample, how school personnel monitored its
production, and the type of information such testing disclosed. Id. Since the students
produced samples in a manner virtually identical to what normally occurs in a public
restroom and the test only revealed illegal drug use, the Court found that the privacy
interests compromised were negligible. Id. Male students who produced samples at a
urinal, remained fully clothed, and school officials supervised them from behind. Id.
Female students produced samples in a closed stall and were monitored on the outside by
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the Court determined that the nature and immediacy of the school's
concern justified drug testing as an efficacious means of addressing the
problem.49 After examining each aspect of this test, the Court concluded
that the Vernonia policy was both reasonable and constitutional. °
C. Suspicionless Drug Testing in Other Contexts
1. Putting School Children in the Same Class as Railway Workers and
Customs Officials
In 1989, the Supreme Court upheld two suspicionless drug testing
schemes, noting that drug tests are searches within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment and that, at times, special needs warrant the use of
random drug testing." In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,52
a female who listened for sounds of tampering. Id. The test only looked for a standard list
of drugs; the school did not create a particularized list for each student. Id. The testing
facility only disclosed the results to a limited number of school personnel and did not
disclose the information to law enforcement. Id.
Only one court has held that the manner of obtaining a urine sample was overly
intrusive and unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Anable v. Ford, 653 F. Supp.
22, 41 (W.D. Ark. 1985). In Anable, the court examined the validity of a suspicion-based
drug testing policy. Id. The school had reason to believe that the students were using
drugs and offered them a drug test to prove their innocence. Id. at 27. If any student
refused the drug test they were deemed guilty and suspended from school for one
semester. Id. Under this testing policy, female students "were required to squat in the
open and to urinate into a vial so that the staff member could verify that the sample was
genuine and not dipped from the toilet." Id. The court concluded that such a test is not
proper and that "requiring a teenaged student to disrobe from the waist down while an
adult school official, even though of the same sex, watches the student urinate in the
'open' into a tube is an excessive intrusion upon the student's legitimate expectations of
privacy .. " Id. at 41. The court held that the drug test used was not reasonable under
the circumstances because the urinalysis employed in this school was "excessively intrusive
in light of the age and sex of the students and the lack of need therefor." Id. at 44. It is
important to note that the district court decided this case before any of the Supreme Court
decisions regarding drug testing, all of which found that the manner of obtaining the urine
samples was not overly intrusive. However, the test utilized in this school district was
much different from those the Supreme Court approved. See, e.g., Vernonia, 515 U.S. at
658.
49. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662-63. The Supreme Court noted the high levels of known
drug use by student athletes and the significant risks that drug use can have on adolescents
and, more specifically, on athletes, including: the probability of injury, increased heart
rate, and increased blood pressure. Id. at 662. The Court reasoned that the drug testing
was particularly efficacious because it assures that athletes do not use drugs and the school
did not resort to drug testing until other, less intrusive means, failed. Id. at 649, 663; see
also supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
50. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665.
51. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1989); Nat'l
Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989).
52. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
2002]
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the Court held that safety regulations, promulgated by the Federal
Railroad Administration (FRA) which mandate alcohol and drug testing
following certain train accidents, without a warrant or individualized
suspicion, did not violate the Fourth Amendment.53 The Court asserted
that the governmental interest in ensuring the safety of railway
employees and prospective passengers "'presents 'special needs' beyond
normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual
warrant and probable-cause requirements."' Given these facts, the
Court focused on the safety concerns at issue compared with the privacy
expectations of employees in an already highly regulated industry."
Prior to enacting this program, the FRA revealed evidence that drug
or alcohol use played a role in at least twenty-one significant train
accidents. The FRA enacted this program to address a specific safety
problem facing the railway industry.57 The Court reasoned that the
privacy interests and the intrusion involved were minimal in contrast to
the substantial governmental interests and threats to public safety.5 The
53. Id. at 620. The regulation mandates toxicological testing following a "major train
accident," an "impact accident," a "fatal train incident," or a "passenger train accident."
FRA Control of Alcohol and Drug Use, Post Accident Toxicological Testing, 49 C.F.R. §§
219.201(a)(l)-(4) (2001). The regulation defines a "major train accident" as an accident
involving "(i) [a] fatality; (ii) [a] release of hazardous material lading from railroad
equipment accompanied by (A) [an evacuation; or (B) [a] reportable injury resulting
from the hazardous material release; ... or (iii) [d]amage to railroad property of
$1,000,000 or more." Id. §§ 219.201(a)(l)(i)-(iii). The regulation defines an "impact
accident" as an accident "resulting in (i) [a] reportable injury; or (ii) [d]amage to railroad
property of $150,000 or more." Id. § 219.201(a)(2)(i)-(ii). The regulation defines a "fatal
train incident" as "[a]ny train incident that involves a fatality to any on-duty railroad
employee." Id. § 219.201(a)(3). The regulation defines a "passenger train accident" as a
"[rieportable injury to any person in a train accident.., involving a passenger train." Id. §
219.201(a)(4). The regulation exempts from toxicology testing any "collision between
railroad rolling stock and a motor vehicle or other highway conveyance at a rail/highway
grade crossing" and any collision "attributable to a natural cause .. " Id. § 219.201(b).
54. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74
(1987).
55. Id. at 624.
56. Id. at 607. In 1985, the FRA passed regulations dealing with drug and alcohol use
on railroads. Id. at 608.
57. Id. at 606. Without using post-accident testing, the FRA identified "34 fatalities,
66 injuries and over $28 million in property damage ... that resulted from the errors of
alcohol and drug-impaired employees in 45 train accidents and train incidents during the
period 1975 through 1983." Id. at 608 (quoting 49 Fed. Reg. 24,254 (June 12, 1984)).
5& Id. at 624. In this instance, the government interest of protecting the safety of
railway passengers outweighed the privacy interests of those tested by this program, and
strict adherence to the warrant and probable cause requirements would frustrate the
government's purpose. Id. The Court stated that the governmental interest involved
would be "placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion." Id.
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Court paid special attention to the risks involved, stating, "employees
who are subject to testing under the FRA regulations can cause great
human loss before any signs of impairment become noticeable to
supervisors or others."59 The Court specifically focused on the safety
sensitive nature of railway employees' jobs and their relationship to the
public in maintaining safe conditions.
The Supreme Court announced its decision in National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab61 on the same day that it announced
Skinner.62 In Von Raab, the Court upheld the Customs Service's drug
testing program as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 6 This
program required suspicionless drug testing of employees applying for
promotion to positions involving interdiction of illegal drugs or requiring
them to carry firearms.6
The Court employed the same reasoning utilized in Skinner, stating
that when there is a demonstrated special need to intrude upon ordinary
Fourth Amendment rights, the Court must "balance the individual's
privacy expectations against the Government's interests to determine
whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some level of
individualized suspicion in the particular context., 65 In Von Raab, as in
Skinner, the purpose of drug testing was to deter drug use by employees
in safety sensitive positions. 6 The Court recognized the safety and public
interests involved, stating, "[t]he public interest demands effective
measures to bar drug users from positions directly involving the
interdiction of illegal drugs. The public interest likewise demands
effective measures to prevent the promotion of drug users to positions
that require the incumbent to carry a firearm .... ,6 The Court also
pointed out that customs officials already have decreased privacy
expectations, commenting that "successful performance of their duties
depends uniquely on their judgment and dexterity," and that such
employees, "cannot reasonably expect to keep from the Service personal
information that bears directly on their fitness." ' Similar to Skinner, the
59. Id. at 628.
60. Id.
61. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
62. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602.
63. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 664.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 665-66.
66. Id. at 666.
67. Id. at 670.
68. Id. at 672.
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Supreme Court focused on the government interests at stake as well as
the risks to the public if any of the individuals subject to drug testing
were in fact using drugs.69
2. A Limitation on Suspicionless Drug Testing
In Chandler v. Miller,7° the Court struck down Georgia's mandatory
drug testing program for individuals running for state office.7' There was
no evidence that Georgia had a particular problem of drug abuse among
candidates for public office. 2  The Court stated that although a
demonstrated drug problem is not required to uphold a drug testing
scheme, it does tend to reveal a special need for a suspicionless search.73
The Court noted that the special needs exception requires a substantial
showing of a need to conduct drug testing; one that is significant enough
to "override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest . . . . " In
this instance, Georgia did not show that it had a significant interest to
drug test individuals running for state office.75 Since running for elected
office is not a safety sensitive position, the Supreme Court refused to• 76
uphold this suspicionless drug testing scheme.
D. Going Beyond Athletes - Suspicionless Drug Testing for Students
Participating in All Extracurricular Activities
Although Vernonia "caution[ed] against the assumption that
suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional muster in other
contexts," the Supreme Court did not indicate how far drug testing in
public schools could extend.77 Relying on Vernonia, the Seventh Circuit,
69. Id. at 670-71.
70. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
71. Id. at 322-23. Under this program, candidates for state office had to "present a
certificate from a state-approved laboratory... reporting that the candidate submitted to
a urinalysis drug test within 30 days prior to qualifying for nomination or election and that
the results were negative." Id. at 309.
72. Id. at 318.
73. Id. at 319. Cf Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666-68 (upholding drug testing for customs
officials, without a specific showing of drug use, due to the safety sensitive nature of their
positions).
74. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
75. Id. at 319 (stating that the requirement is "not well designed to identify
candidates who violate antidrug laws. Nor is the scheme a credible means to deter illicit
drug users from seeking election to state office").
76. Id. at 323. The Court noted that Georgia revealed no pressing crisis or evidence
of a drug problem among candidates for office, which had been revealed in Vernonia with
respect to student athletes. Id. at 316, 319. The Court also noted that drug use among
candidates does not jeopardize public safety. Id. at 323.
77. Vernonia Sch. Dst. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,665 (1995).
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in Todd v. Rush County Schools, upheld the Rush County Schools' drug
testing program." This program required all students wishing to
participate in any extracurricular activity to consent to random
suspicionless urinalysis testing for "alcohol, unlawful drug, and cigarette
usage. . . ."" The court found the school district's interest in deterring
drug use compelling and found no difference between athletics and other
extracurricular student organizations." Concluding that the "reason[s]
compelling drug testing of athletes also applies to testing of students
involved in extracurricular activities," the Seventh Circuit relied heavily
on the fact that participation in extracurricular activities is a privilege."
With drug use among teenagers on the rise, the school district was
seeking a means to prevent drug abuse among its students.
82
In Miller v. Wilkes, the Eighth Circuit came to a similar conclusion,
when it uphled a program that mandated student and parental consent to
random drug testing before the school permitted a student to participate
in any activity outside the regular curriculum.83 The Eighth Circuit
reasoned that the school district had a compelling interest in deterring
drug use and that a random testing program effectively satisfied that
need.84 In applying the three-part Vernonia test, the Eighth Circuit found
78. Todd v. Rush County Schs., 133 F.3d 984, 986-87 (7th Cir. 1998). The Seventh
Circuit first considered suspicionless drug testing in Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School
Corp., 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988). In Schaill, the Seventh Circuit upheld the school
requirement that interscholastic athletes must consent to random urinalysis testing to be
eligible to compete in interscholastic sports. Id. at 1310.
79. Todd, 133 F.3d at 985.
80. Id. at 986. The court reasoned that participants in extracurricular activites, like
athletes, take "leadership roles in the school community and serve as an example to
others." Id. The court looked to its earlier decision in Schaill, which upheld random drug
testing of school athletes, and stated that "participation in interscholastic athletics is a
benefit carrying with it enhanced prestige and status in the student community." Id.
(quoting Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1320). The court reasoned that the participants in other
extracurricular activities have the same increased prestige as athletes, making those
students indistinguishable from athletes. Id.
81. Id. at 986; see also Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 1061
(7th Cir. 2000).
82. Todd, 133 F.3d 986 (stating that the program was designed to deter drug use); see
also Ida Chipman, Random Testing Reduced Drug Abuse in Schools, SOUTH BEND
TRIBUNE, Sept. 10, 2000 (stating that drug testing "gives kids a reason to say no," and
argues that drug use decreased after drug testing began). But see NATIONAL CENTER FOR
HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2001 WITH URBAN AND RURAL
HEALTH CHARTBOOK (2001) (showing that drug use among school-aged children has
remained static throughout the 1990s).
83. Miller v. Wilkes, 172 F.3d 574, 576 (8th Cir. 1999), vacated as moot, No. 98-3227,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13289, at *1 (8th Cir. June 15, 1999).
84. Id. at 581.
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that the balance fell in favor of the school district. 5 First, the court noted
that students have less privacy protections than ordinary citizens. 6 Next,
the Eighth Circuit examined the character of the intrusion involved and
concluded that the urinalysis testing used was no more intrusive than the
test approved in Vernonia.87  Finally, considering the nature and
immediacy of the concern and the efficacy of the school district's policy,
the court reasoned that drug abuse is currently a serious problem facing
schools and suspicionless drug testing a portion of its students is an
effective means to address the concern.88
The Seventh Circuit revisited this question in Joy v. Penn-Harris-
Madison School Corp. where, relying on stare decisis, a panel of the
Seventh Circuit upheld the Penn-Harris-Madison (PHM) School
Corporation's drug testing scheme." This policy required consent to
random drug testing as a condition to participate in extracurricular
activities.9 Under PHM's policy, any student who refused to consent was
automatically assumed to admit to drug or alcohol use. 9'
In applying the three-part Vernonia test in Joy, the court indicated that
the PHM's policy did not meet the criteria set forth in Vernonia.92 In
considering the nature of the privacy interest, the Joy court reasoned that
participation in extracurricular activities does not create the same
decreased expectation of privacy that exists with student athletes.93
Examining the nature of the government's concern, the court stated, "the
85. Id. at 578-581.
86. Id. at 578.
87. Id. at 579.
88. Id. at 580-81. The court noted that the problem facing the school district was not
as immediate as that facing Vernonia. Id. However, the court concluded that drug use
itself was a serious enough concern for any school district and that drug testing was an
effective means to address the problem. Id.
89. Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052,1066 (7th Cir. 2000).
90. Id. at 1066. The Seventh Circuit also addressed the question of mandatory drug
testing for students suspended for more than three days for fighting. Willis v. Anderson
Cmty. Sch. Corp., 158 F.3d 415, 418-20 (7th Cir. 1998). The Seventh Circuit struck down a
policy requiring drug and alcohol testing of all students suspended for fighting, stating that
it did not fall within the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 424-25.
They reasoned that a suspicion-based system could better meet the school's needs with
respect to students suspended for fighting. Id. at 425. In a related issue, the Ninth Circuit
invalidated a school district policy allowing dog sniffing of students for drugs as an
unreasonable search. See B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260,1263 (9th Cir.
1999). The Ninth Circuit reasoned that this type of suspicionless search was offensive and
infringed upon students' "reasonable expectation[s] of privacy." Id. at 1266.
91. Joy, 212 F.3d at 1056.
92. Id. at 1063-65.
93. Id. at 1063.
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School has not proven, or even attempted to prove, that a correlation
exists between drug use and those who engage in extracurricular
activities... ."9 Nevertheless, a three-judge panel of the Seventh Circuit
upheld this analysis relying on the principle of stare decisis and the
court's recent decision in Todd.95
By focusing on the voluntary nature of extracurricular groups, the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits extended Vernonia to allow random
suspicionless drug testing of students involved in non-athletic
extracurricular activities. Most recently, however, the Tenth Circuit
reached the opposite conclusion, creating a split among the circuits. In
94. Id. at 1064.
95. Id. at 1066. The judges in Joy stated:
As the previous sections make clear, the judges of this panel believe that students
involved in extracurricular activities should not be subject to random,
suspicionless drug testing as a condition of participation in the activity.
Nevertheless, we are bound by this court's recent precedent in Todd. Given that
the opinion in Todd was issued only two years ago, that the facts of our case do
not differ substantially from the facts in Todd, that the court in Willis reaffirmed
the basic principles in Todd, and that the governing Supreme Court precedent
has yet to address the matter, we believe that we must adhere to the holding in
Todd and affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment for the School as
it relates to testing students involved in extracurricular activities.
Id.
96. Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 509
(2001). District courts in Texas have recently dealt with suspicionless drug testing
schemes. See Tannahill v. Lockney Indep. Sch. Dist., 133 F. Supp. 2d 919, 931 (N.D. Tex.
2001) (holding that the school district did not show "sufficient special needs to justify
suspicionless drug testing..."); Gardner v. Tulia Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 2:97-CV-020-J,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20253 at *12 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2000) (reaching a conclusion
similar to that of the Tenth Circuit Earls court in striking down a suspicionless drug testing
scheme). In Tannahill, the court struck down a drug testing policy that applied to the
entire student population of junior and senior high school students as unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment. Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 930. The court noted that the
school district had not revealed significant evidence of drug abuse. Id. The court further
reasoned that "[aJttending school is not akin to participation in a highly regulated
industry .. " Id. at 930. In Gardner, a Texas district court struck down a drug testing
program that included all extracurricular activities, noting that the policy reached eighty
percent of the student body and that there was no indication of vast drug abuse among
these students. Gardner, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20253, at *6-7; see also Jim Yardley,
Family in Texas Challenges Mandatory School Drug Test, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2000, at
Al (discussing the Tannahill lawsuit, noting that the school's policy required all students
to submit to testing and that refusal resulted in the same punishment as a positive test
result). The Tannahill lawsuit has received a great deal of media attention and reflects the
controversy surrounding this issue. See David Stevens, Father Say [sic] He's Outcast for
Fighting Drug-Test Policy: Many Residents in Small Town Unhappy with Lawsuit Filed
Against School District, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 30, 2000 at 27A. Mr. Tannahill,
the father who initiated this lawsuit, was the only parent to object to the school's policy.
Id. Many Lockney residents objected to the lawsuit, one saying "'[w]e've got 400 kids
we're trying to help, and one person [is] trying to spoil everything."' Id. Another resident
2002]
Catholic University Law Review
Earls v. Board of Education,97 the Tenth Circuit stated that "[w]e do not
believe that voluntary participation in an activity, without more, should
reduce a student's expectation of privacy in his or her body."98 Applying
the Vernonia test, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that although the privacy
interest itself was minimal, the school district did not reveal any evidence
of particularized drug use by students participating in extracurricular
activities. 99 The court determined the school's drug testing policy was not
efficacious and, thus, violated the students Fourth Amendment rights. l"
The court held that before a school district could compel student and
parental consent to random drug testing as a requirement to join an
extracurricular school activity, it must demonstrate "some identifiable
drug abuse problem among a sufficient number of those subject to the
testing, such that testing that group of students will actually redress its
drug problem."' 1  The Tenth Circuit was not willing to extend drug
testing without a showing of an actual special need.' 2
II. THE TENTH CIRCUIT PROPERLY ANALYZED VERNONIA TO
REQUIRE EVIDENCE OF A SPECIAL NEED BEFORE SUBJECTING
STUDENTS TO SUSPICIONLESS DRUG TESTING
A. Drug Testing Participants in All Extracurricular Activities Does Not
Follow From the Established Special Needs Analysis
1. Distinguishing Safety Sensitive Public Employees from Public
School Students
In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n'°3 and National Treasury
Employers Union v. Von Raab,'O° the Supreme Court allowed random
stated, "'he's the only one against this and he has no good reason .... If he doesn't want
to do drug testing, all he has to do is pull [his son Brady] out and send him to [a nearby
public school]. We're not forcing him to do this .. .- Id. Mr. Tannahill, on the other
hand, argued that "'if you think you've got a problem with one of my boys, call me. I'll
take care of it. The good Lord gave them to us, not to the school district."' Lyle
Denniston, School Drug Test Debate Sharpens, BALT. SUN, Mar. 27, 2000 at 2A.
97. 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 509 (2001).
98. Id. at 1276.
99. Id. at 1275-77. The Tenth Circuit stated that the method of testing and records
obtained were virtually identical to the procedure upheld in Vernonia and found the
invasion of privacy was insignificant. Id. at 1276.
100. Id. at 1277.
101. Id. at 1278.
102. ld; see also Trinidad Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095, 1110 (Colo. 1998)
(striking down a similar drug testing policy as violating the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution).
103. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
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suspicionless drug testing for public employees in safety-sensitive
positions."l 5 The Court believed that preventing a train accident or an
unintentional shooting certainly created a special need to ensure a drug
free environment. 15 The safety-sensitive nature of these positions makes
drug testing imperative for both the employees and the general public.""
In Von Raab, the Supreme Court stressed that customs officials are the
first line of defense against drug smuggling."5 It is essential that those
persons responsible for drug interdiction are not themselves involved in
drug use."59 The Court noted that drug smugglers are not shy about
bribing officials and that the position itself often involves a significant
element of danger."0 These conditions directly threaten the safety of
customs employees, and it is imperative that they are both physically and
mentally competent to handle the position."'
The same public health and safety concerns that apply to customs
officials apply to railway employees."' Railway employees conduct
passenger trains, where drug use can significantly jeopardize public
safety."3 The FRA proved that conducting a train while under the
influence of drugs or alcohol can cause serious accidents and the loss of
life." 4  The significant safety interests at stake override the privacy
invasions of railway employees."5
This same degree of concern for public safety does not exist in non-
athletic extracurricular activities. Athletes, often involved in contact
sports, are more prone to injuries if they are using drugs." 6 The effects of
104. National Treasury Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
105. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 677-679.
106. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620-21; Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670.
107. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606-08 (describing the safety concerns regarding railway
employees); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668-70 (discussing the significant concerns that could
arise if customs officials, "our Nation's first line of defense" against drug smuggling, were
using drugs).
108. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668.
109. Id. at 670.
110. Id. at 669.
111. See id. at 669-70 (noting the compelling interest in "ensuring that front-line
interdiction personnel are physically fit, and have unimpeachable integrity and
judgment").
112- Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606 (discussing the safety concerns that arise when train
conductors use drugs).
113. Id. at 606-07; see also supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
114. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 606-07.
115. Id. at 624.
116. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 662 (1995) (quoting Hawkins,
Drugs and Other Ingesta: Effects on Atheltic Performance, in Appenzeller, MANAGING
SPORTS AND RISK MANAGEMENT STRAGEGIES 90, 90-91 (1993)). Hawkins discusses the
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drug use, including increased heart rate and blood pressure, can have
serious ramifications in athletic activities.117 In this sense, athletes, like
added risks drug use creates for athletes, including slowed reactions, lessened awareness of
pain, increased heart rate, increased blood pressure, reduced sweating, increased body
temperatures, and masking "the normal fatigue response," all which can lead to serious
injury when combined with athletic competition. Id. Drugs and alcohol can have a
detrimental affect on "motivation, memory, judgment, reaction, coordination, and
performance." Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist., 796 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D. Or. 1992)
vacated by, 575 U.S. 646 (1995); Tannahill v. Lockney Indep. Sch. Dist., 133 F. Supp. 2d
919, 930 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (stating that "attending school is not akin to participation in a
highly regulated industry .... Moreover, the academic studies of a student, while very
important, do not embody the immediate and severe life and death repercussions as do the
decisions of these employees"); see also Random Tests of Students in Special Activities Still
Open Question, 10 DRUG DETECTION REPORT 180 (Nov. 30, 2000) (stating that
extracurricular activities "are importantly distinguished from sports because of the
emphasis that has been placed on the possibility that individuals under the influence of
drugs could be hurt while engaged in sports...").
117. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662; see also The National Clearinghouse for Alcohol and
Drug Information, Drugs of Abuse, available at http://www.health.org/ govpubs/rpo926/
(last visited Nov. 8, 2001) (providing definitions and effects of various drugs). For
example, stimulants such as cocaine cause "increased heart and respiratory rates, elevated
blood pressure, dilated pupils and decreased appetite; high doses may cause rapid or
irregular heartbeat, loss of coordination, collapse; may cause perspiration, blurred vision,
dizziness, a feeling of restlessness, anxiety, delusions." Id. Inhalants, including gas in
aerosol cans, known as "huffing," causes "loss of muscle control, slurred speech,
drowsiness or loss of consciousness." Id. Cannabis, including marijuana, causes "impaired
memory, concentration, knowledge retention; loss of coordination . . . fragmentary
thoughts, [and] disoriented behavior .. " Id. Although these side effects can have
dramatic physical effects on any teenager, they can be more severe in active athletic
competition. See Brief for Appellant at 17-20, Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264 (10th
Cir. 2001) (No. Civ-99-1213-R). In Earls, the ACLU argued that the school district's drug
testing policy did not remedy a threat to safety because the students involved engaged in
"no hazardous activities whatsoever .. " Id. at 17. The ACLU also argued that in
Skinner, Von Raab, and Vernonia, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the safety
concerns as a basis for justifying random drug testing. Id. at 18. Furthermore, the ACLU
argued that in Chandler, the Supreme Court specifically found that the lack of safety
concerns rendered the policy unconstitutional. Id. at 19. In contrast to the safety-sensitive
areas where the Court validated drug testing, non-athletic extracurricular activities do not
"raise tangible safety issues." Id. at 20. The ACLU argued:
The suggestion that such activities as Academic Team, Band, or Choir are
dangerous at all, let alone dangerous enough to override ordinary Fourth
Amendment protections, strains Tecumseh's credibility beyond the breaking
point. In fact, these activities are even less dangerous than some ordinary
classes, where activities such as chemistry experiments or the use of power tools
in shop class might become dangerous due to impairment. It is undisputed that
no student has ever been injured while engaged in competitions of the Academic
Team, Band, or Choir, and the few alleged dangers conjured up by the District-
including such supposed hazards as Choir members tumbling off the stage, Band
members colliding while they march in formation, and ringing bells while
standing outside Wal-Mart-are obviously contrived and speculative. Indeed,
the District candidly admits that safety concerns played no role in its decision to
target non-athletics in its scheme.
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railway employees and customs officials, are involved in a safety-
sensitive activity." By comparison, non-athletic activities do not have
such safety concerns, and they cannot be analogized to the safety-
sensitive positions the Supreme Court has considered when upholding
drug testing.119
In addition, prior to Skinner, the railway industry and its employees
were already highly regulated; these additional regulations did not
further interfere with the privacy rights of railway employees."O
Similarly, in Von Raab, the Court noted the decreased privacy
expectations that customs officials already endured by the nature of their
position. 121 This is highly distinguishable from students participating in
non-athletic extracurricular activities, who do not have the same
decreased expectations of privacy that exist in athletics.' 2 Athletes must
Id. at 20 (citations omitted). These arguments reveal the characteristics that distinguish
athletic from non-athletic activities. The lack of safety concerns involved in non-athletic
extracurricular activities removes them from the special needs exception that the Court
has carved out of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 17.
11& Id. at 18 (stating that "in Vernonia, safety was [of] pivotal importance in the
Supreme Court's finding of a special need for a drug testing regime aimed specifically at
athletes engaging in risky sport activities").
119. Id. at 20.
120. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626 (stating that because the FRA regulations already
required blood tests, urine testing was no more invasive than the already permitted
regulations). The Court did point out that urine testing, in itself, does raise different
concerns because excretory functions are traditionally shielded by great privacy. Id. Since
the employees provided urine samples "in a medical environment, by personnel unrelated
to the railroad employer," the Court viewed it as similar to the already required physical
examinations. Id. at 626-27.
121. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672 (1989) (stating
that employees involved in drug interdiction can reasonably expect background checks
and inquiry into their fitness and dexterity, which can be impaired by drug use).
122. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657. A situation similar to a locker room setting that
might lead to a decreased expectation of privacy, does not exist with non athletic
extracurricular activities, such as a debate team or the chess club. See Trinidad Sch. Dist.
No.1 v. Lopez, 963 P.2d 1095, 1106, 1110 (Colo. 1998) (invalidating the school district's
random drug testing policy as unconstitutional under the United States Constitution,
stating that members of the marching band, unlike athletes, did not have to shower and
change in a communal setting, and therefore, did not have the same decreased privacy
expectation as athletes). Examples of non-athletic extracurricular activities include:
Student Council, Honor Society, Drama Club, Quiz Bowl, 4-H Club, Choir, Key Club,
Band, Mock Trial, Future Farmers of America, Future Business Leaders of America. See,
e.g., South Terrebonne High School Extracurricular Activities, available at http://www2.
cajun.net/-gator/extracurricular.extracurricular.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2002), Sheldon
High School Extracurricular Activities, available at http://www.sheldon.k12.ia.us/extra-
curricular.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2002). These activities do not typically involve a
physical examination or locker room setting, making them distinguishable from athletics.
Trinidad, 963 P.2d at 1106, 1110.
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obtain a physical examination before participating in the interscholastic
season and often must submit a urine sample as part of the
examination. 23  In contrast, non-athletic activities do not require a
physical examination as a prerequisite to participate.'24 The Supreme
Court noted that there is a decreased level of privacy inherent in athletics
because of the locker room setting.' However, unlike interscholastic
athletes, most extracurricular activities do not involve "a communal state
of undress" that would decrease students' expectations of privacy.'26
The Supreme Court specifically focused on the distinguishing factors
between athletic and non-athletic activities in upholding the drug testing
program in Vernonia.'2' The Seventh and Eighth Circuits failed to
recognize the essential characteristics upon which the Supreme Court
relied."" Instead, the courts grouped athletic and non-athletic
extracurricular activities together, ignoring the well-established
requirements of the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment. 2'
In Todd, the Seventh Circuit stated that the reasons "compelling drug
123. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657 (stating that athletes must submit to a preseason
physical exam that includes giving a urine sample); Schaill v. Tippecanoe County Sch.
Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1318 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that participants in the athletic program
have to produce a urine sample as part of a required medical examination).
124. See Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 1063 (7th Cir. 2000)
(stating that students participating in non-athletic extracurricular activities "do not subject
themselves to more explicit and routine loss of bodily privacy as a necessary component of
their participating in the activities in question"). The court also noted that although
extracurricular activities do have rules that the students must follow, "those rules do not
require the same surrender of physical privacy as required of the student athletes in
Vernonia." Id.
125. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657 (discussing the "state of communal undress" inherent in
the locker room setting). Cf Trinidad, 963 P.2d at 1106-1107 (stating that the marching
band is not in the same class as athletics when it comes to decreased privacy because band
members "do not undergo the type of public undressing and communal showers required
of student athletes").
126. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657. The Supreme Court stated that athletes have a
decreased expectation of privacy than other students because athletes "suit up" before the
game and "shower and change afterwards." Id. The Court indicated that this state of
communal undress inherent in the locker room decreased the level privacy that student
athletes could expect. Id. Drug testing, they reasoned, would not infringe any farther on
students' privacy rights than the locker room setting and the physical examinations that
were already a part of interscholastic athletics. Id.
127. Id. at 657-62 (applying its three-part test, the Supreme Court weighed the specific
issues facing the school district against student athletes privacy interests); see also supra
notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
128. Miller v. Wilkes, 172 F.3d 574, 582 (8th Cir. 1999), vacated as moot, No. 98-3227,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13289, at *1 (8th Cir. June 15, 1999); Todd v. Rush County Schs.,
133 F.3d 984, 986 (7th Cir. 1998).
129. Miller, 172 F.3d at 582; Todd, 133 F.3d at 986.
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testing of athletes also applies to testing of students involved in
extracurricular activities. ""3 The Todd court ignored the specific factual
findings upon which the Supreme Court relied in Vernonia and, instead,
upheld the drug testing program simply because these students opted to
participate in extracurricular activities.' In Joy, a panel of the Seventh
Circuit reached a different conclusion stating that "there is no
correlation between students involved in extracurricular activities and
drug abuse." '132 The court nonetheless upheld the drug testing policy
because of the recent precedent set in Todd.'33
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit did not take notice of the Supreme
Court's factual findings in Vernonia.134 In Miller, the Eighth Circuit
stated that "students who elect to be involved in school activities have a
legitimate expectation of privacy that is diminished to a level below that
of the already lowered expectation of non-participating students." '135 The
court acknowledged that participants in extracurricular activities are
bound by the rules of the activity in which they participate, as are
130. Todd, 133 F.3d at 986; see also W. Bradley Colwell, Beyond Vernonia: When Has
a School District Drug Testing Policy Gone Too Far? 131 EDUC. LAW REP. 547, 552-53
(1999) (arguing that the Seventh Circuit's decision in Todd did not apply Vernonia when it
upheld the drug testing policy). Colewell stated:
The Todd court appeared to provide a less than exhaustive legal analysis ....
[T]he court did not apply the three-tier Vernonia test .... Moreover, it failed to
discuss Fourth Amendment principles or case law regarding legitimate
expectation of privacy, consent, or individualized reasonable suspicion. The
Todd court only minimally supported its affirmation of the school district policy
when it stated the reason compelling the testing was valid because 'successful
extracurricular activities require healthy students.' Further, the court reiterated
that extracurricular activities are a 'privilege' and 'voluntary,' therefore implying
that students who wish not to be tested can forgo participation in such activities.
... In sum, the Seventh Circuit did little to strengthen legally the notion of
testing all extracurricular participants. The court failed to even minimally apply
binding Supreme Court precedent and relied on a case that was clearly
distinguishable.
Id. (quoting Todd, 133 F.3d at 986).
131. See Todd, 133 F.3d at 986 (noting that the drug testing program only applies to
students who chose to join an extracurricular activity). Cf Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d
1264, 1276 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. granted 122 S. Ct. 509 (2001) (stating that the voluntary
nature of participation alone does not lessen a student's expectation of privacy).
132. Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th Cir. 2000).
133. Id. at 1063. The court stated, "[i]f we were reviewing this case based solely on
Vernonia and Chandler, we would not sustain the random drug, alcohol, and nicotine
testing of students seeking to participate in extracurricular activities. Nevertheless, we
believe that the doctrines of stare decisis and precedent require our adherence to Todd...
Id.
134. Miller, 172 F.3d at 579.
135. Id.
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athletes.'36 However, the court failed to examine any specific decreases
in privacy that arise in non-athletic extracurricular activities."'
The Tenth Circuit agreed that students participating in non-athletic
extracurricular activities have a "somewhat lesser privacy expectation,"
but indicated that it was different from that applied to athletes 38 The
Tenth Circuit, by examining the nature and immediacy of the concern
and the efficacy of the chosen solution, did not focus as heavily on the
privacy expectations as it did on the third prong of the Vernonia test.'39
2. The Limitation of Chandler - Requiring a Showing of a Special Need
While the Supreme Court held that a special need to conduct
suspicionless drug testing exists for public school interscholastic
athletes,' railway employees, 4' and customs officials,'42 it struck down
suspicionless drug testing of candidates for public office. 43 In Chandler
v. Miller, the Supreme Court held that drug testing candidates running
for public office does not fall within the special needs exception to the
Fourth Amendment. 44 Contrary to the holdings in Vernonia, Skinner,
and Von Raab, the Court distinguished Chandler by stating that this
policy was neither an effective means to "identify candidates who violate
antidrug laws," nor a "credible means to deter illicit drug users from
seeking election to state office."' 45 The Court concluded by recognizing
that where public safety is not sincerely an issue, the "Fourth
Amendment precludes the suspicionless search . ".'.. ,4  Chandler
136. Id.
137. Id. (stating that a school employee monitored participants in all extracurricular
activities for compliance with the groups and the schools rules.) Cf Vernonia v. Sch. Dist.
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661-662 (examining the specific privacy and safety concerns
involved in athletics).
138. Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1275-76 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. granted 122 S.
Ct. 509 (2001). The Tenth Circuit stated that students participating in non-athletic
activities choose to adhere to some additional rules and regulations, including, meeting the
same scholastic standards as athletes. Id at 1276.
139. Id. at 1275-77.
140. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665-66 (1995).
141. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989).
142. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,668 (1989).
143. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 319.
146. Id. at 323.
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represents the first instance that the Supreme Court struck down a
suspicionless drug testing scheme.'47
The Chandler Court rejected the state's arguments that illegal drug use
questions "an official's judgment and integrity; jeopardizes the discharge
of public functions . . . and undermines public confidence and trust in
elected officials . . . [It] serves to deter unlawful drug users from
becoming candidates. ... "'48 The Court asserted that the interests at
stake were not "important enough to override the individual's
acknowledged privacy interest., 149  This holding reiterated the
requirement of a special need that is "sufficiently vital to suppress the
Fourth Amendment's normal requirement[s]" before a valid
suspicionless drug testing scheme may be instituted."O In Chandler, the
fact that elected officials take leadership roles was not a sufficient
justification to invade their Fourth Amendment rights."'
By noting that the state showed neither a particularized drug problem
nor specific safety concerns, the Chandler Court left open the possibility
that suspicionless drug testing of students participating in extracurricular
activities may not survive further constitutional scrutiny.'52 In upholding
other suspicionless drug testing policies, the Supreme Court primarily
relied on evidence that safety was a "substantial and real" concern."'
The majority of extracurricular activities, such as Debate Team or Chess
147. Id. The Supreme Court has heard four cases on random drug testing policies and
upheld the policy in every instance except Chandler. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309 (striking
down a drug testing policy that required candidates for elected office to submit to random
testing); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665-66 (upholding suspicionless drug testing of public
school interscholastic athletes); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633 (upholding suspicionless drug
testing of railway employees following certain train accidents); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668
(upholding suspicionless drug testing of customs officials who carried firearms or were
responsible for drug interdiction).




152. Id. at 323.
153. Id.; see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 649-650 (1995)
(acknowledging the serious challenges facing the school district, the known drug use by
athletes, and the failure of other less intrusive means to deter drug use); Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 606 (1989) (discussing the safety concerns facing the
railway industry following train accidents caused by drug and alcohol use); Nat'l Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 515 U.S. 646, 670-671 (1989) (noting the significant role
that Customs officials play as our first line of defense against drug smuggling and the
significant need to prevent drug use by these employees).
20021
Catholic University Law Review
Club, do not involve physical contact between students that creates the
same safety concerns that are prevalent in athletic competition.'
The Seventh and Eighth Circuits failed to acknowledge the specific
safety concerns involved in athletic competition. 15   The Eighth Circuit
simply stated that the possibility of harm was enough to find the drug
testing scheme constitutional, even though school officials admitted that
there was no immediate crisis facing the school system.'56 The Seventh
Circuit reasoned that "successful extracurricular activities require
healthy students," but did not address any specific safety concerns
involved.157 By ignoring this significant facet of the special needs
analysis, the Seventh and Eighth Circuits exceeded the scope of the
Supreme Court's standard in a manner that should be considered
unconstitutional.
The Tenth Circuit properly recognized this point, stating, that "[i]t is
difficult to imagine how participants in vocal choir, or the academic team,
or even the Future Homemakers of America are in physical danger if
they compete in those activities while using drugs. ... ,,158 The court
noted the safety concerns involved in these activities are no different
than those involved in curricular activities not subject to the testing
policy, such as working in wood shop or science laboratories, however,
the school did not attempt to extend testing to all students based on
154. Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1277 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. granted 122 S. Ct.
509 (2001) (stating that students involved in non-athletic extracurricular activities are not
in physical danger if the compete while using drugs); see also Brief for Appellant at 17-20,
Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001) (No. Civ-99-1213-R) (arguing that
there is no risk of immediate harm in non-athletic extracurricular activities).
155. Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 1065 (7th Cir. 2000)
(stating that the school did not reveal any immediate safety concerns regarding students
participating in extracurricular activities); Todd v. Rush County Schs., 133 F.3d 984, 986
(7th Cir. 1998); see also Miller v. Wilkes, 172 F.3d 574, 580-81 (8th Cir. 1999), vacated as
moot, No. 98-3227, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13289, at *1 (8th Cir. June 15, 1999) (indicating
that drug use in itself is significant enough of a problem that schools have a compelling
interest in preventing it before it starts, but not addressing any specific safety issues with
respect to students participating in extracurricular activities); see also Recent Cases:
Constitutional Law - Fourth Amendment - Seventh Circuit Holds that Random
Suspicionless Drug Testing of Participants in Extracurricular Activities Does Not Violate
the Fourth Amendment - Todd v. Rush County Schools, 133 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 1998),
Cert. Denied, 119 S. Ct. 68 (1998), 112 HARV. L. REV. 713, 715-16 (1999) (stating that
"[t]he Seventh Circuit failed to address the critical distinctions between the targeted
groups in Vernonia and Todd and thus erroneously likened Rush County's drug testing
program to the one in Vernonia").
156. Miller, 172 F.3d at 580-81.
157. Todd, 133 F.3d at 986.
15& Earls, 242 F.3d at 1277.
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safety risks. 59 That being the case, extending testing to participants in
extracurricular activities without a showing of a genuine special need was
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
B. Comparing the Circuits: Drug Testing Participants in Extracurricular
Activities
In both Todd v. Rush County Schools'6' and Miller v. Wilkes,161 the
Seventh and Eighth Circuits followed Vernonia's holding that the
intrusion on students' privacy was minimal compared with the
governmental interest and the efficacy of the drug testing policies.' 62 In
contrast with Vernonia, however, these two cases focused on the desire to
prevent drug use, but not on the specific needs of the schools involved,
the drug problems they faced, or the special safety concerns that the
Supreme Court focused on with regard to athletes.' 6 In doing so, neither
the Seventh or Eighth Circuit satisfied the third prong of the Vernonia
test - the nature and immediacy of the concern and the efficacy of the
solution.'6 Therefore, these courts sanctioned an invasion of these
students' privacy rights.
Significantly, in Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Corporation,'6 the most
recent decision on the issue, a panel of the Seventh Circuit indicated that
it did not agree with its earlier judgment but that they were bound by
stare decisis.66 The court said, "the judges of this panel believe that
students involved in extracurricular activities should not be subject to
random, suspicionless drug testing as a condition of participation in the
activity. Nevertheless, we are bound by this court's recent precedent in
Todd."' 67 The panel stated that it would adhere to the Seventh Circuit's
159. Id. The court further reasoned that if the dangers of drug use were the only
safety concern, then the logical solution would be to test all students. Id. at 1277 n.12.
The school district instead narrowed its searches to participants in extracurricular
activities, revealing that the policy "is not motivated simply by health care concerns." Id.
160. 133 F.3d 984 (7th Cir. 1998).
161. 172 F.3d 574 (8th Cir. 1999), vacated as moot, No. 98-3227, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
13289, at *1 (8th Cir. June 15, 1999).
162 See Id. at 579-81; Todd, 133 F.3d at 986.
163. Todd, 133 F.3d at 986 (stating that the "linchpin" of the drug testing program was
to "protect the health of the students involved"). The Seventh Circuit did not mention
any specific drug problem affecting these students, simply the need to protect them just in
case they happened to be using drugs. Miller, 172 F.3d at 580 (stating that there is no
evidence demonstrating a drug problem in this school district).
164. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 660 (1995).
165. Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052 (7th Cir. 2000).
166. Id. at 1066.
167. Id.
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previous holding because the facts in Joy were substantively similar to
those is Todd, decided two years earlier.' 6 The panel also followed the
earlier decision because the Supreme Court had not yet addressed the
issue.' 69 In applying the Vernonia test in Joy, the Seventh Circuit
revealed its doubt that the program in Joy met the standards set forth in
Vernonia7 ° This doubt within the Seventh Circuit further reveals the
conflict regarding this issue. 7'
In Vernonia, the Supreme Court allowed suspicionless drug testing
following a showing of a valid special need; the school found that high
drug use among student athletes creates a substantial threat to the
students.' n Neither the Seventh nor Eighth Circuit looked for actual
evidence of drug use among students participating in extracurricular
activities before upholding the schools' drug testing programs.173 The
168. Id. The court later stated that the doctrine of stare decisis required them to affirm
the district court judgment. Id. at 1067; see also supra note 95.
169. Joy, 212 F. 3d at 1066.
170. Id. at 1065.
171. ld.; see also Willis v. Anderson Cmty. Sch. Corp., 158 F.3d 415 (7th Cir. 1998),
(striking down a school policy that required suspicionless drug testing of all students
suspended for three or more days for fighting). The court held that the policy did not fit
within the special needs exception of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 424. The school
argued that data establishing a "nexus between illegal substances and violent behavior"
was enough to create the reasonable suspicion that a student suspended for fighting was
using an illegal substance. Id. at 418. The court rejected this argument, stating that a
suspicion-based system would address the school's concern. Id. at 424. The court also
rejected the argument that students suspended for fighting were similarly situated to
participants in extracurricular activities because one voluntarily engages in misconduct.
Id. at 422. The court reasoned that in the context of extracurricular activities, drug testing
is part of the "bargain a student strikes in exchange for the privilege of participating in
favored activities." Id. In comparison, the court stated that "this degree of consideration
- and certainly this appreciation of the consequences" does not exist in the "typical fight
between fifteen-year-olds." Id. It is especially interesting Judge Cummings, the judge
who wrote the decision in Todd, also agreed with the decision in Willis. Id. at 417; see also
Todd v. Rush County Schs., 133 F.3d 984, 984 (7th Cir. 1998). The court implied that
participants in "favored" extracurricular activities have a different attitude than students
who get into fights, a "disfavored" activity, Willis, 158 F.3d at 422-23, namely they are
aware that with participation comes sacrifice. One would think that a student who gets
into a fight knows that there are consequences for that action. The argument that
members of the student counsel have less privacy than those suspended for fighting is
ridiculous. The fact that the court struck down the policy in Willis further reveals the
serious Fourth Amendment implications of drug testing in public schools.
172. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 644 (1995).
173. Joy, 212 F.3d at 1064-65; Willis, 158 F.3d at 581; Todd, 133 F.3d at 986-87. In
Todd, the court stated that the reasons behind testing athletes were no different than
those for testing all participants in extracurricular activities, deterrence of drug use. Id. at
986. The Seventh Circuit pointed to data showing that drug use at the Rush County
Schools was lower than the Indiana average. Id. at 984. In Joy, the court stated that
although the school district had revealed that drug use in their school was higher than the
Drug Testing of Public School Students
Tenth Circuit, however, correctly questioned the efficacy of drug testing
schemes that did not seek to address a specific drug abuse problem,
revealing the Fourth Amendment concerns when a school district seeks
to drug test its students without any evidence of a drug problem.'74 In
Earls v. Board of Education,175 the Tenth Circuit focused on the Supreme
Court's discussion in Vernonia of the specific findings of drug use by
student athletes.76 Contrary to Vernonia, there was no evidence of a
drug use problem with students in Earls, thus eliminating the efficacy of
drug testing these students as a means to deter drug use.' 77 The Tenth
national average, they made no similar showing that a drug problem existed among
students participating in extracurricular activities. Joy, 212 F.3d at 1065. In Miller, the
Eighth Circuit upheld the drug testing program even though there was no evidence of drug
use. Miller, 172 F.3d at 581; see also Recent Cases, supra note 155 at 717 (opining that the
"Seventh Circuit erred by not finding dispositive the fact that there was no showing of a
correlation between participants in extracurricular activities and drug use at Rush County
High School").
174. See Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264, 1278 (10th Cir. 2001); see also Gardner v.
Tulia Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 2:97-CV-020-3, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20253, at *12 (N.D.
Tex. Dec. 7, 2000) (striking down a testing policy that included both athletic and non-
athletic extracurricular activities where there was no showing that a drug problem existed
within any segment of the student body); Tannahill v. Lockney Indep. Sch. Dist., 133 F.
Supp. 2d 919, 931 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (striking down a drug testing program seeking to
randomly test all members of the student body without showing epidemic drug use within
the school district). The Tannahill court found that the suspicionless drug testing program
did not fit within the special needs exception because it is "not specifically targeted to the
special needs of a drug crisis or safety-sensitive job functions." Id. at 930. The court
acknowledged the school districts' "good faith efforts" to win "a frustrating war on drugs,"
but pointed out the dangers of blanket drug testing on our constitutional freedoms,
stating, "[e]xperience should teach us to be most on guard to protect liberty when the
Government's purposes are beneficent . . . . The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding." Id.
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 429, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
175. 242 F. 3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001).
176. Id. at 1276-77 (pointing out that the final prong of the Vernonia test, looking at
the nature and immediacy of the concern and the efficacy of the solution, was applied to a
specific problem that was not present among the students participating in extracurricular
activities). Id.
177. Id. at 1277-78. School personnel in the school district testified on drug use in their
district. Id. at 1272-73. Carolyn Daugherty, a choir director, testified that she had never
caught a member of her choir using illegal drugs and that during her twenty-nine years of
teaching, she referred only one student to the office for suspected drug use. Id. at 1273.
Sheila Evans, a teacher, testified that she did not believe that any of the students
competing in FHA used drugs. Id. Danny Jacobs, an assistant superintendent, testified
that of the 243 students tested during the 1998-1999 school year, three tested positive. Id.
Other teachers testified that they suspected some students of drug use. Id. One teacher
estimated that he saw ten students per year that he suspected of using drugs. Id. This
evidence hardly establishes an epidemic problem. See Brief for Appellant at 17-20, Earls
v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001) (No. Civ-99-1213-R) (arguing that there is
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Circuit also examined the safety risks involved in athletics and compared
those risks with risks in other extra-curricular activities. 78 The court
determined that the drug testing scheme in Earls would not be able to
truly identify those students actually using drugs, and it did not properly
address the safety concerns connected with drug use.179
The Tenth Circuit properly analyzed this issue by determining that a
school district should not be able to test its students randomly without
showing an identifiable drug use problem that creates a special need for
such testing."" In the absence of finding of a special need, no school
district should be able to extend suspicionless drug testing to include
participants in non-athletic extracurricular activities. Such an extension
violates the test established in Vernonia and is unconstitutional under the
Fourth Amendment. To be meaningful, the special needs exception
must require an actual showing of a substantial and compelling need to
diminish the already low privacy rights afforded to school children.
no evidence of a drug problem among the students affected by this policy). The
Appellants argued that:
In sharp contrast to the concrete findings of abuse in Skinner and Vernonia, the
record here shows no evidence whatsoever pointing to a drug problem among
the non-athlete students targeted by the District's testing policy. While the
district court appeared to suggest that the existence of any drug use at all in the
High School as a whole would suffice to demonstrate a special need ... such a
reading would render the special needs test meaningless in the school context.
The fact that Tecumseh High School, like every other high school in America,
has failed to eradicate all drug use hardly justifies elimination of Fourth
Amendment rights, especially for the very students least likely to use drugs.
Id. at 13 (internal citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit also recognized these facts in
Earls. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1277-78. Unless schools can show some identifiable drug
problem amongst its students, random drug testing is not an efficacious solution under
Supreme Court precedent. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661-62.
178. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1277.
179. Id. (stating that the testing program includes both "too many students and too
few" to be effective from a safety point of view).
180. Id. at 1278; see also Tannahill v. Lockney Indep. Sch. Dist., 133 F. Supp. 2d 919,
928-31 (N.D.Tex. 2001) (striking down a suspicionless drug testing policy that applied to
the entire student body, stating that the general notion of "maintaining drug-free schools
or desires to detect illegal conduct are insufficient as a matter of law to demonstrate the
existence of special needs"); Gardner v. Tulia Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 2:97-CV-020-J, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20253, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2000) (striking down a random drug
testing policy that applied to suspicionless drug testing of Seventh through Twelfth graders
who participated in extracurricular activities).
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III. RETURN TO VERNONIA: IDENTIFIABLE DRUG ABUSE SHOULD BE A
PREREQUISITE FOR ANY SCHOOL DISTRICT SEEKING TO IMPOSE SUCH
A POLICY
A. Testing Students Without Showing a Drug Use Problem Fails the Third
Prong of the Vernonia Test
Randomly testing a portion of the student body for drug use, without
showing that these are the students using drugs, fails to address the
requirement of showing there is a significant problem.18' Such random
testing also unnecessarily punishes those students who want to join
activities, forcing them to give up their privacy rights if they want to
participate and presuming their guilt if they refuse to consent to testing."'
In Earls, the Tenth Circuit recognized that there is no logical reason for
singling out these students without making a proportional showing of
drug use by the student body effected."'
181. See Todd v. Rush County Sch., 133 F.3d 984, 985 (7th Cir. 1998) (detailing the
schools attempt to show a significant drug problem). In Todd, the Seventh Circuit pointed
out that cigarette use for Rush County tenth graders was higher than the state average,
alcohol use for eleventh and twelfth graders was higher than the state average, but
marijuana use for ninth and twelfth graders was lower than the state average. Id. at 984.
The school district did not attempt to show drug use among students participating
specifically in extracurricular activities. See id. In addition the school district appeared to
have less of a drug problem than others in Indiana. See id. This further questions whether
they met the immediacy of the concern requirement in Vernonia. Todd v. Rush County
Schs., 139 F.3d 571, 571 (7th Cir. 1998) (denying rehearing of original Todd decision). The
dissenters in the Seventh Circuit stated that there "is no showing of a particularized need
because of a 'state of rebellion' . . . and certainly no showing that the targeted group...
presents a particularized need." Id. at 572. The dissenters also argued that Chandler
required the government to demonstrate a need to test the identified group, which was
absent in Todd. Id.
182. Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 1056 (7th Cir. 2000)
(noting that "students who refuse to take the drug test are deemed to have admitted they
are under the influence of drugs or alcohol.. ."); Tannahill, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 922 (stating
that "any refusal by the student and/or parent, to sign the consent form will be treated as a
positive test, and subject the student to consequences set forth in this policy..."). Some
opponents argue that drug testing these students can actually increase drug use in the
overall student body. See Lynn Zimmer, Drug Testing USA: A Policy for Maximising
Harm, at http://www.drugtext.org/articles/967110.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2001); Robert
Taylor, Compensating Behavior and the Drug Testing of High School Athletes, 16 CATO
JOURNAL (1997), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/ cj16n3-5.html; see also
infra note 196.
183. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1278 (holding that any district seeking to impose a suspicionless
drug testing scheme must demonstrate an identifiable drug abuse problem because
"[s]pecial needs must rest on demonstrated realities") (quoting United Teachers v.
Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 142 F.3d 853, 857 (5th Cir. 1998)); see also William J. Bailey,
Current Issues In Drug Abuse Prevention: Suspicionless Drug Testing in Schools, Indiana
Prevention Resource Center (July 19, 1997), at http://www.drugs.indiana.edu/issues/
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In Vernonia, the Supreme Court considered the "nature and
immediacy of the governmental concern at issue.., and the efficacy of
[the] means for meeting it.""'8  The Vernonia School District
demonstrated an immediate concern that greatly affected a specific
segment of their student body.' 8 In comparison, the school districts in
Joy, Todd, Miller, and Earls could not show the same level of drug use
among its students."" Only the Tenth Circuit, in Earls, recognized this
significant fact."'
In upholding suspicionless drug testing programs, the Seventh and
Eighth Circuits failed to note that the Supreme Court paid close
attention to the specific drug abuse problems facing the school district in
Vernonia.1 " Nevertheless, one may argue that drug testing students
without showing that there is drug abuse among their peer group may
still act as a deterrent.'8 By not requiring any showing of drug use
among the students included in the testing, the Seventh and Eighth
Circuits failed to show either an immediate concern or that the
government's approach was efficacious. Furthermore, a drug testing
scheme that fails a prong of the Vernonia test does not survive
constitutional scrutiny."9
susipicionless.html (stating that "[P]articipation in school athletics and extracurricular
activities is a protective factor that reduces the likelihood that a youth will use alcohol,
tobacco, and other drugs") (emphasis in original).
184. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 660 (1995).
185. Id. at 662-63. In examining the immediacy of the district's concerns, the Court
pointed to the district court's conclusion that "a large segment of the student body,
particularly those involved in interscholastic athletics, was in a state of rebellion," and that
"the rebellion was being fueled by alcohol and drug abuse as well as by the student's
misperceptions about the drug culture." Id.; see also supra notes 9, 34 and accompanying
text.
186. Joy at 1064, 212 F.3d at 1064; Todd, 133 F.3d at 985; Miller, 172 F.3d at 580; Earls,
242 F.3d at 1276-77.
187. Earls, 242 F.3d at 1272-73.
188. Todd, 133 F.3d at 986-87 (upholding drug testing of participants in extracurricular
activities without showing a drug problem or safety concerns particular to these students);
Miller, 172 F.3d at 580 (upholding random drug testing even though the school district
showed no "immediate crisis"); see also Colwell, supra note 130 at 552-53 (arguing that the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Todd did not apply Vernonia in upholding the drug testing
scheme).
189. See generally Hearing, supra note 12. DeLa Salle Drug Testing Results revealed
that the percentage of students testing positive decreased from three percent to less than
one percent during the two years that the school conducted random drug tests. Id. at 21.
DeLa Salle is a private school in Louisiana, where consenting to drug testing is required
for admission. Id. at 29.
190. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-664.
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B. Testing a Small Sampling of Students Cannot Address the Significant
Drug Abuse Concerns Facing Schools
Drug abuse is a problem facing many American schools today and
should not be taken lightly. 91 However, allowing random drug testing of
students who participate in extracurricular activities unnecessarily
infringes upon the rights of some students while ignoring possible drug
use by others. While drug testing policies may prevent drug use by some
students, they fail to address drug use by those who do not participate in
extracurricular activities. 92 As the Seventh Circuit pointed out in Joy,
these policies permit drug testing on a group basis and allow drug testing
191. Hearing supra note 12 at 30-33. Statistics show that illicit drug use among
adolescents increased between 1990 and 1996. Id. According to these statistics, 37.8
percent of all high school students (sample size - 70,964) had used illicit drugs from 1995-
1996, compared with 20.9 percent in 1990-1991 (sample size 127,101). Id. at 30. But see
NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, supra note 82 at 247-49. Other studies
show that adolescent drug use has remained constant throughout the 1990s. See, e.g. id. at
247. The National Center for Health Statistics reported that marijuana use among twelve
to seventeen year olds dropped from nine percent to seven percent between 1997 and
1999. Id. In addition, the study showed that cocaine use among twelve to seventeen year
olds dropped from 2.6 percent to 0.8 percent between 1979 and 1999, remaining at 0.8
from 1998 to 1999. Id. The National Center for Health Statistics also reported that
marijuana use among high school seniors dropped from 33.7 percent to 21.6 percent
between 1980 and 2000. Id. at 248. Marijuana use, however, remained relatively
unchanged among high school seniors from 1996 to 2000, with use in 1996 at 21.9 percent;
1997 at 23.7 percent; 1998 at 22.8 percent; 1999 at 23.1 percent; and 2000 at 21.6 percent.
Id. The only drug that saw an increase in use during this time period was ecstacy, which
increased from 2.0 percent in 1996 to 3.6 percent in 2000. Id. at 249; see also U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Applied Studies, Summary of
Findings from the 2000 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, at http://www.samhsa.
gov/oas/NHSDA/2kNHSDA/chapter2.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2002). A survey conducted
by the U.S. Deepartment of Health and Human Services showed that overall drug use
among twelve and thirteen year olds decreased during 1999 to 2000, from 3.9 percent to
3.0 percent; marijuana use decreased from 1.5 percent to 1.1 percent; psychotheraputic
drug use decreased from 1.8 percent to 1.6 percent; cocaine use decreased from 0.2 percent
to 0.1 percent; hallucinogen use decreased from 0.3 percent to 0.2 percent; and inhalant
use decreased from 1.3 percent to 0.7 percent. Id. at fig. 2.4. This survey further showed
that drug use among fourteen through seventeen year olds remained virtually constant
from 1999 to 2000. Id. at fig. 2.5. Furthermore, this survey revealed that drug use peaks
between the ages of eighteen and twenty (when people are likely to be in college and
unable to be tested for drug use). Id. at fig. 2.3. It is possible that although less students
will use drugs if they are being tested in high school, they will likely experiment once they
get to college. Id. Once individuals reach the age of 21, however, drug use dramatically
decreases as age increases. Id.
192. See Sandy Louey, Schools Considering Drug-Testing Program: Trustees May Get
Recommendation This Spring, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 21, 1999, at 1G (stating that
drug testing can give "students a way of escaping peer pressure to use drugs by providing
them a reason to refuse."); Elizabeth Campbell, School Officials Saying Drug Testing
Going Well, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Mar. 1, 2000, Metro at 4 (stating that drug
testing "gives kids a good reason to say no").
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"for all but the most uninvolved students."' 93 As a result, school districts
fail to reach those students who are perhaps the most in need of
significant intervention by the schools.'9
Some argue that drug testing only a portion of the student body may
actually increase drug use. 95 For example, drug testing athletes, may
193. Joy v. Penn-Harris-Madison Sch. Corp., 212 F.3d 1052, 1064 (7th Cir. 2000); See
also Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 667 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that because of Vernonia
"the millions of these students who participate in interscholastic sports, an overwhelming
majority of whom have given school officials no reason whatsoever to suspect they use
drugs at school, are open to an intrusive bodily search").
194. Bailey, supra note 183 (stating that "participation in school athletics and
extracurricular activities is a protective factor . . . student athletes and students
participating in extracurricular activities are among the lowest risk students for
involvement with alcohol, tobacco, and other drugs"); School Weighs Expansion of Drug-
Testing Policy, SOUTH BEND TRIB., Feb. 5, 1998 at B3 (discussing school district plans to
expand drug testing to band and choir students and the concern of one board member that
"the at-risk kids are the ones not involved in extra-curricular activities."); Appellant's
Opening Brief at 16 n.10, Earls v. Bd. of Educ., 242 F.3d 1264 (10th Cir. 2001) (No. Civ-99-
1213-R) (stating that "[n]ationwide statistics show that participation in extracurricular
activities, by reducing after-school free time, helps reduce involvement in risky pursuits
such as drug use.").
195. Zimmer, supra note 182 (discussing the potential harms that can arrive from drug
testing). Zimmer stated:
Drug testing in the schools may also increase rather than decrease the prevalence
of drug problems among youth. Its advocates have suggested that by detecting
adolescent drug users, before any indicators of dysfunction, early "intervention"
is possible. However, this ignores that most youthful drug use is occasional and
transitory and does not require intervention. It also assumes that intervention
produces only positive consequences. The truth is it does not. Simply being
labeled a drug user is stigmatizing and is likely to generate negative reactions
from parents, teachers, and non drug-using peers. As a result, some options and
opportunities may be foreclosed, thereby pushing adolescent drug users deeper
into a deviant subculture. Furthermore, admitting youthful drug users into drug
treatment programmes where they are encouraged to think of themselves as
"addicts" may ultimately produce more harmful patterns of drug use, marked by
therapist defined cycles of "relapse and recovery". Thus, drug treatment should
not be regarded as inevitably benign.
Nor are school-based testing programs likely to have much deterrent value.
Currently, such programmes are largely limited to students enrolled in sports or
other extracurricular activities, with exclusion being the primary sanction
imposed on those testing positive. What this means is that students attracted to
both drugs and school sponsored activities must choose between the two. Of
course, the requirement of choosing may stop some adolescents from using
drugs; however, it may also stop some adolescents from engaging in activities
that, in the long run, protect them from escalating their drug use. Thus, for
students not deterred, drug testing may actually reduce the likelihood of their
drug use remaining occasional and transitory.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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cause some members of the team to quit to avoid drug testing.19 If these
theories prove true, drug testing a portion of the student body will have
the opposite effect than intended. Drug testing can actually deter
students from participating in extracurricular activities.' 97 As a result,
there is an increased risk that students will choose drug use over
participation in extracurricular activities, which arguably decrease drug
198use.
The Seventh Circuit noted that participants in extracurricular
activities, like athletes, assume a leadership position in school.199 The
court reasoned that because of this leadership role these students
assumed a decreased expectation of privacy and could therefore be
subjected to random drug testing." This reasoning is flawed. It is true
that athletes take on a leadership role.201 It is also true that participants
in extracurricular activities similarly take on a leadership role.2°2
However, the same is also true with respect to other students not subject
to this policy. The student who makes the honor roll every semester
takes on a leadership role, yet, they are not subject to drug testing under
these policies unless they choose to join an extracurricular activity. A
policy that reaches students simply because of a presumed leadership
role is not efficacious because it can leave out a significant portion of the
student body and will most likely miss the students most in need of
intervention.2°3
Furthermore, leadership does not implicate safety nor does it imply
high levels of drug use. In Chandler v. Miller, the Supreme Court struck
196. See Taylor, supra note 182 (arguing that drug testing athletes may increase overall
drug use because marginal athletes may quit the team to avoid drug testing). The author
stated that, "drug testing, by invading the privacy of student athletes and by making
continued drug use difficult or impossible ... will most probably lead marginal student
athletes to 'quit the team.' Freed from the regimen of athletics, these former athletes may
revert to the drug-use patterns of their nonathlete peers .. " Id.
197. See supra notes 195-196.
198. See Bailey supra 183 (stating that participation in extracurricular activities is a
protective factor); see also U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Adolescent Time Use, Risky Behavior
and Outcomes: An Analysis of National Data (Sept. 11, 1995), at http://www.apse.hhs.gov/
hsp.cyp/xtimuse.htm (stating that participation in extracurricular activities decreases free
time and reduces student involvement in risky behavior).
199. Todd v. Rush County Schs., 133 F.3d 984, 986 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that





203. See supra note 194.
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down a drug testing scheme that tested candidates for elected office.2 °
Candidates for elected office are considered leaders. °5 Yet, the Supreme
Court struck down the drug testing policy because there were no safety
concerns at issue, nor was there any evidence of drug use among this
class of citizens; there was no special need.""
C. Other Possible Solutions to Adolescent Drug Use
A series of government documents discussing tips for preventing drug
use did not address drug testing as a means of deterrenceiY Instead,
these documents focused on education, peer discussion groups, and
parental guidance."" The Center for Substance Abuse Prevention calls
for drug prevention methods that include education, a focus on the
dangers of drug use, peer discussions, demonstrating alternatives to drug
use, and community involvement that addresses drug use from a variety
of angles.2°Y Drug testing opponents call for education and preventative
204. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305,309 (1997).
205. See Id. at 311.
206. 1d. at 319, 323.
207. See National Institute on Drug Abuse, Prevention Principles for Children and
Adolescents, at http://www.nida.nih.gov/Prevention/PREVPRINC.html (last visited on
Feb. 8, 2002); see also Tips for Prevention Programming: Effective Drug Prevention
Strategies (May 1997), available at http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/
prevent/tips2. html (stating that prevention programs that emphasize personal skills were
most effective in reducing drug and alcohol use); see also Joetta Sack, School Drug-
Prevention Programs Found to Come Up Short, EDUC. WEEKLY, at
http://www.edweek.org/we/vol-16/23drug.h16 (last visited Feb. 8, 2002) (stating that the
most successful drug prevention programs teach children how to resist drug use and deal
with peer pressure to use drugs).
208. See, e.g., Sack, supra note 207.
209. Center for Substance Abuse Prevention, 2000 Annual Summary: Effective
Prevention Principles and Programs 24 (2000) (indicating that effective programs focus on
risk and protective factors). This study provided examples of successful drug prevention
programs. Id. For example, Across Ages, a school and community-based prevention
program matches up school-aged children with adult mentors to provide role models and
focuses on boosting self esteem, problem solving skills, and increasing knowledge about
alcohol and tobacco use. Id. at 24. Across Ages focuses on students aged ten through
thirteen and providing participants increased knowledge and ability to respond to
situations involving drug use. Id. at 24, 26. In addition, Athletes Training and Learning to
Avoid Steroids (ATLAS), a program focused on male high school athletes, is designed to
teach these athletes about the risks of steroid use, provide healthy sports nutrition
alternatives, provide skills to resist using drugs, build team ethics, and develop team
intolerance for drug use. Id at 26. According to this study, ATLAS participants had a "50
percent reduction in new use of anabolic steroids; lower use of alcohol, illicit drugs, and
sport supplements; and reduced drinking and driving occurrences [one] year after the
intervention." Id. at 27.
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measures rather than focusing on testing as a means to deter drug use.210
Others claim that urinalysis is not a reliable means of drug testing
because it often produces false positives, which lead to inaccurate
accusations.
The solution to adolescent drug use should address all students on a
widespread basis rather than focusing on suspicionless drug testing of a
portion of the student body. Focusing on education, the dangers of
drugs, community involvement, providing alternatives to drugs, and
teaching adolescents how to avoid social pressures can effectively deter
drug use without interfering with the constitutional rights of students. A
school district should not resort to drug testing until those less intrusive
methods are proven ineffective.12
IV. CONCLUSION
Although a return to individualized suspicion is not possible in light of
Vernonia and other cases permitting suspicionless drug testing, the
Supreme Court should find that drug testing all students who participate
in extracurricular activities is unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment unless a school district can demonstrate a special need to
employ such testing. In each of the circumstances where the Supreme
210. See Drug Testing - Does It Deter Drug Abuse? 8 CQ RESEARCHER 1001-24
(Nov. 20, 1998). In this article, Professor William Sonnenstuhl, a professor of industrial
labor relations, stated, "I don't think drug testing deters anyone, except for the novices...
Skillful drug users know how to beat the tests. It just becomes a game they have to
play." Id. at 1008. Professor Sonnestuhl pointed out that drug abuse did not decrease in
the railroad industry until the unions started educating their members about drug testing.
Id. at 1007-08
211. Bailey, supra note 183 (claiming that urinalysis, the least expensive means of drug
testing, often results in false positives); see also Harry Connick, Public High School Drug
Testing Program for Student Athletes: Policy and Plan, Sample Policy for Student Athletes,
at http://www.noda.new-orleans.la/us/source/drugpolicy.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2002).
Harry Connick, district attorney for Orleans Parish, Louisiana, proposed a sample
proposal requiring school districts to rely on hair analysis for drug testing. Id. Mr.
Connick, who also testified at the Congressional Hearing on Drug Testing in School, supra
note 12, stated that hair testing expands the detection period, is more difficult to alter, and
is less intrusive and embarrassing than taking a urine sample. Connick, supra; see also
Dana Hawkins, Trial by Via More Schools Give Urine Tests for Drugs - But at What
Cost?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 31, 1999), at 70, available at
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/issue/990531/nycu/drugs.htm (stating that urinalysis tests
are wrong five to sixty percent of the time). When in high school, honor roll student and
baseball player, Travis Robinett falsely tested posted for tetrahydrocannabinol (THC)
and, as a result, was kicked off the baseball team and lost the opportunity to obtain a
college athletic scholarship. Id. Such scenarios reveal the dangers that suspicionless drug
testing can have on innocent students. Id.
212. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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Court upheld suspicionless drug testing, it did so only after specific
factual findings revealed a valid special need. The Tenth Circuit
properly recognized this fact, while the Seventh and Eighth Circuits
ignored this essential aspect of Vernonia. Requiring evidence of wide
spread drug abuse and valid safety concerns among students subject to
drug testing will provide the Fourth Amendment protections required by
the Constitution. Schools will be required to meet all three prongs of
Vernonia by proving an immediate and widespread concern that drug
testing can effectively address.
